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The starting point for this project is the bifurcated system of water management in 
the United States, specifically Texas, which treats surface water and groundwater under different 
regimes. This bifurcation is not present in Brazil and the state of Rio Grande do Sul due to 
a federally recognized unit of administration that encompasses the entire hydrological basin, 
rather than administering rivers, swamps, and aquifers separately. While much debate has 
focused on the takings aspect of a change in groundwater law, little debate has focused on 
the affects on bio&versity that would occur from a change in groundwater law; Increasingly 
science has shown that water, in all its forms, is interconnected in such a manner that only 
through a unified, integrated, approached, taking into account the entire hydrological cycle, 
can we achieve effective water management and environmental protect-ion. 
The note proceeds as follows. Section II provides a hydrological primer to provide 
the necessary scientific context through which the legal discussion will proceed. Section III 
discusses the varying surface water regimes in the United States. Section IV details four of 
the broad families of groundwater regimes in t:he United States, while Section V focuses 
specifically on the groundwater regime in Texas. Section VI analyzes the special case of the 
Edwards Aquifer in Texas. Section VII examines the shortcomings of the Federal Endangered 
Species Act, as it is the preferred tool for limiting groundwater extraction in Texas. Section 
VIII discusses Texas Senate Bill 1 and the attempt to redesign of Texas water law in 1999. 
From section IX the discussion switches to Brazil and the constitutionalization of Brazilian 
environmental law as a framework for understanding the water regime. Section X introduces 
groundwater law in Brazil generally, while section XI focuses specifically on the groundwater 
laws of Rio Grande do Sul. 
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II. HYDROGEOLOGY PRIMER 
In order to understand how Texas groundwater law fails to adequately protect 
biodiversity, we must understand the interaction between groundwater and biodiversity. I 
divide this section into three parts. First, I will present a short overview of the hydrologic 
cycle. Next, I will briefly discuss the two basic pathways in which groundwater and surface 
water interact. Finally, I will discuss how biodiversity is affected by these interactions. 
A. The Hydrologic Cycle and Groundwater 
The hydrologic cycle describes the continuous flow of water in its various forms -
liquid, solid, gas, and vapor- from atmosphere to ground to ocean. Water evaporates off 
the oceans and is moved by winds over land. As the moisture level in the air increases, the 
vapor become precipitation and fails to the ground. Some of the water on the ground will 
evaporate and some of the water will remain on the Earth. Plants will take some of the 
water. Some of the water returns to the oceans through rivers and streams. Finally, some of 
the water seeps into the ground. This seepage of water into the ground is called recharge. It 
is through this recharge that aquifers are replenished. 
The amount of recharge that reaches the aquifer is dependent upon the geological 
formation surrounding the aquifer. 1 The more permeable the layer of rock that is above the 
aquifer, the more it will be able to recharge. Impermeable rock will result in zero recharge for 
the aquifer, thus water extraction will completely empty the aquifer. 
B. Groundwater-Surface Water Connections 
The term groundwater includes all water located below the surface.2 An aquifer is 
defined as "as subsurface waterbearing geological formation from which significant quantities 
of water may be extracted."3 The terms groundwater and aquifer are often used interchangeably, 
and I will do so in this article. There are two general ways in which groundwater can affect 
surface water.4 The aquifer can feed the stream, a gaining stream (Figure 1 a), or the aquifer can 
1 See Gabriel Eckstein and Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeolocial Approach to Transboundary Ground 
Water Resources and International Law, 19 Am. U. Int'l. L. Rev. 201, 211-217 (2003) for a more detailed 
discussion of the geology of aquifers. 
2 Specifically groundwater only refers to the water found in saturated zones of geological formations 
[see Ralph C. Heath, Basic Ground-Water Hydrology, U.S. Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 2220, 
4 (1987)]. Under Texas law, groundwater .is defined as "water percolating below the surface of the 
Earth." [Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.001(5) (Vernon Supp. IA 2002)]. 
3 Robert Hayton and Albert Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: 1he Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 Natural 
Resources Journal, 677, 678 (1989). 
4 Surface water refers to water above ground, such as streams, lakes, wetlands, bays and oceans. (see 
Thomas C. Winter, Judson W Harvey, 0. Lehn Franke, and William M. Alley, Ground Water and 
Surface Water: A Single Resource, US Geological Survey Circular 1139, 2. (1998). 
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be fed by the stream, a losing stream (figure 1 b) .. 5 When surface water and groundwater are 
connected, extraction of groundwater can have serious consequences on the surface water. If 
a stream is feeding the aquifer, pumping will result in an increased flow from the surface water 
to the aquifer, thus lower in the surface water level.6 If an aquifer is feeding the surface water 
some of the water that would have been discharged into the surface body will be captured, 
likewise diminishing the surface water level. 7 As discussed above, the permeability of the rock 
that overlies the aquifer will affect the connectedness of the groundwater and the surface water. 
The plight of the Santa Cruz River presents a vivid example of the 
interconnectedness of groundwater and surface water. 8 The Santa Cruz River nurtured what 
was once fertile land for the Hohokam, the Tohono O'odham, and Spanish missionaries. 
Eventually, the city of Tucson was established on the Santa Cruz. As Tucson grew in the 
1900s, groundwater pumping increased. Quickly, groundwater pumping outpaced recharge. 
Recharge from rain and snow that fell on nearby mountains added about 140,000 acre-feet 
per year ( afy) to the underlying aquifer. 9 As the population of Tucson grew from 1940 to 
2000, groundwater extraction accelerated from 50,000 afy to 330,000 afy. 10 The Santa Cruz 
has run dry as the aquifer no longer contains enough water to feed it. 
C. Groundwater Affecting Biodiversity 
Biodiversity and groundwater interact both on and below the surface. A number 
of ecosystems rely on groundwater. Geology and other factors determine the reliance an 
ecosystem has on groundwater, but the groundwater does supply minerals as well as moisture 
to the ecosystem.11 Ecosystems in arid climates, such as West Texas, often are more reliant 
on groundwater than those in climates where freshwater is more pervasive.12 There are a 
number of types of groundwater dependent ecosystems. 
Groundwater can feed into surface bodies, such as wetlands, and, together with 
surface water, create an ecosystem of its own.13 \X-'hile differentiating between groundwater 
and surface water may be difficult, these ecosystems the groundwater component is still 
crucial to the functioning of the ecosystem. 
5 Id, at 9. 
6 Id. at 14. 
7 Id. at 14. 
8 See Robert Glennon, TiVater Follies: Groundwater Pumping and the Fate of America's Fresh Waters, 35-
50 (2002). Glennon's book has numerous examples of the effects of groundwater extraction on a 
variety of surface water bodies. 
9 Id. at 45. 
io Id. 
11 Friends of the Earth, Groundwater Dependent Eco-Systems (May 28, 1999), a'vailable at Nature 
Conservation Council of New South Wales, http: I /www;nccnsw.org.au/water/projects/Groundwater/ 




Groundwater is also an important component in riparian and terrestrial vegetation 
ecosysterns.14 Although these ecosystems are mainly dependent upon surface waters, during 
times of drought, these ecosystems need to access aquifers for fresh water.15 Declining water 
tables, primarily through groundwater extraction, can be particularly devastating on these 
ecosystems, causing dehydration or water-logging through changes in water salinity.16 In the 
case of the Santa Cruz River, the '"draining" of the river resulted in the disappearance of 
riparian cottonwood, willow, and mesquite trees as well as the disappearance of deer, coyotes, 
javelinas,, mountain lions, raccoons, foxes, rabbits, and squirrels, all of which relied on the 
Santa Cruz as a source of water. 17 
The hyporheic zone is a fluctuating zone between the surface water and the deeper 
groundwater. 18 This zone provides habitat for many invertebrates as groundwater supplies 
nutrients and surface water provides dissolved oxygen.19 This ecosystem is patticularly 
vulnerable as groundwater contamination and extraction as well as surface water pollution 
can disrupt its equilibrium.20 
Additionally, ecosystems can solely existvlithin in aquifor. Hypogean ecosystems, as 
they are called, are quite .interesting due to the lack oflight in the habitat and their vulnerability 
to human induced change.21 The Edwards Aquifer represents a notable example of this type 
of ecosystem with the Texas blind salamander, the fountain darter and other species. 
III. SURF ACE WATER LAW IN THE UNITED ST A TES AND TEXAS 
In order to understand how law in the United States, and Texas in particular, fails 
to adequately address the interconnectedness of groundwater and surface water, we must 
understand how each of these areas of law function. This section addresses surface water 
law, while the next section addresses groundwater law. 
The ownership of surface water in the United States is governed at the state level. 
There are two main regimes that determine who owns what water: riparianism and prior 




17 Glennon, supra note 8, at 48-49. 




22 Many states have adopted a "mixed" system which incorporates aspects of both riparianism and prior 
appropriation. These mixed systems typically protect minimal (domestic use) riparian rights and 
apply priority of appropriation for the remainder of water in the stream. 
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(those west of the hundredth meridian) adhere to the prior appropriation regime.23 In this 
section I provide an overview of the two regimes that govern surface water in the United 
States, followed by a brief discussion of Texas surface water law in particular. 
A. Riparianism 
Riparianism was imported to the early United States from English common law. 
The English law relied on the natural flow doctrine which allowed each riparian to receive the 
flow of the stream "undiminished as to quality or quantity" and to seek redress even in the 
absence of a harm.24 Additionally, riparians were limited to on-tract uses only. This model 
worked well in the pre-industrial era, but as industries began to rely on water to power mills, 
the natural flow doctrine was seen as impeding growth. 
American courts in the early nineteenth century began to chip away at the natural 
flow doctrine in order to promote industrialization. In Tyler v. Wilkinson, the circuitcourt 
for the district of Rhode Island rejected the right of riparianism to receive the natural flow of 
the stream without diminution.25 This right was seen as a brake on development as it 
effectively banned all diversions from the stream. The same year, the Supreme Court of 
Vermont dealt another blow to the natural flow doctrine in the United States.26 In a dispute 
over the installation of a new mill upstream from a mill already in operation, the court stated 
that strict adherence 1to the natural flow doctrine would allow the first miller on a stream to 
control the flow of the entire stream, thus inhibiting production.27 
.i ne limitation on undiminished water quality was also whittled away by early court 
decisions. In Snow v. Parsons, the Vermont Supreme court eschewed the strict water quality 
standard of the natural flow doctrine for a reasonableness standard.28 In Snow, a tannery 
was charged with diminishing the quality of a stream. The court stated that the relevant test 
is "[i] f it essentially impairs the use below, then it is unreasonable and unlawful, unless it is 
a thing altogether indispensable to any beneficial use to every point of the stream."29 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court summed up the judicial mindset during the industrial period 
by stating that "[t]he law should be adjusted to the exigencies of the great industrial interests 
of the Commonwealth ... The proprietors of large and useful interests should not be 
hampered or hindered for frivolous or trifling causes."'30 
23 Joseph L. Sax, Barton H. Thompson, Jr., John D. Leshy, and Robert H. Abrams, Legal Control of Water 
Resources: Cases and Materials 4-5, 20 (3d ed. 2000). 
24 Sax et al, supra note 23, at 22. 
25 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.RJ. 1827). 
26 Martin 'U. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184 (Vt. 1827). 
27 Id. at 475. 
28 28 v t. 459 (1856) 
29 Id. at 462. 
30 Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 86 Pa. 401, 408 (1878). 
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Modern riparian doctrine generally relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Section 850 states that "[a] riparian proprietor is subject to liability for making an unreasonable 
use of the water ... that causes harm to another riparian proprietor's reasonable use of water."31 
Reasonable use is determined by a number of factors that include: the purpose of the use; the 
economic value of the use; the social value of the use; and the extent and amount of harm it 
causes.32 Riparianism has evolved into a general regime of correlative rights. 
B. Prior Appropriation 
The Prior appropriation doctrine originated in the western half of the United 
States. Prior appropriation is premised on the "first in time, first in right" concept.33 There 
are four elements in acquiring an appropriative right, (1) there must be unappropriated water 
in a (2) natural stream, and the appropriator must (3) divert this water and ( 4) put it to 
beneficial use. 34 The first element simply requires that the appropriator is not taking water 
on which another party has a claim. The second element, a natural stream, is defined as: 
A stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed 
and sides or banks, and discharging itself into some other 
stream or body of water. The flow of water need not be 
constant, but must be more than mere surface drainage 
occasioned by extraordinary causes; there must be substantial 
indications of the existence of a stream, which is ordinarily a 
moving body of water.35 
The definition of a natural stream really only excludes groundwater and seepage or 
springs. The third element, diversion, can be physical diversion ofwater from the stream via 
a ditch, but many courts do not require physical diversion, simply using the water from the 
stream can be a "diversion."36 
The fourth element, beneficial use, has been the object of much debate in prior 
appropriation states. Most states have codified the definition of "beneficial use."37 Texas 
defines beneficial use as: 
31 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850 (1979). 
32 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850A (1979). 
33 See A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N. Dale L. Rev. 881 (2000) for 
an review of and issues related to Prior Appropriation doctrine. 
34 Sax, et al., supra note 23, at 111-2. 
35 Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 488 (1909). 
36 See State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev: 1988) and Steptoe Live Stock Co. v. Gulley, 53 Ne'r. 163 (1931). 
37 See Janet C. Neuman, Symposium on W'7ater Law: Benefic.ial Use, Waste, cmd Foifeiture: 1he Inefficient 
Search for Efficiency in Western Water Law, 28 Envtl. L. Rev. 919, fnl (1998). 
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"the amount of water which is economically necessary for a 
purpose authorized by this chapter, when reasonable 
intelligence and reasonable diligence are used in applying the 
water to that purpose and shall include conserved water."38 
The California Water Code, on the other hand, devotes a large portion in defining 
what actions and what considerations may be included in a "beneficial use" determination: 
instream use; public interest; water transfers. 39 Generally, beneficial use includes domestic 
uses as well as agrarian and industrial without excessive waste. 
Prior appropriation systems in most states are currently administered by a permit 
system. State statutes set out the requirements for obtaining a permit. These statutes 
typically require an application for the permit40, notice of the application to potentially 
interested parties41 , and the possibility of a hearing if there is a protest42• Permits will specify 
the date of the appropriation, the amount to be appropriated and when it can be appropriated. 
C. Surfac:e Water Law in Texas 
In 188943, 189544, and 191345, the Texas Legislature adopted the prior appropriation 
system for Texas. Although these laws brought the prior appropriation doctrine to Texas, 
they did not abolish preexisting riparian rights; they simply made all future water rights 
contingent on prior appropriation through the permitting process.46 The Texas Water Code 
states that an application for a water permit may be granted if there is (1) unappropriated 
water47 , (2) the proposed appropriation is for beneficial use,48 does not impair existing water 
rights or riparian rights,49 is not detrimental to the public welfare,50 considers the effects on 
bays, estuaries, instream use, water quality, groundwater, and fish and wildlife habitats,51 is 
consistent with state and regional water plans,52 and ( 4) reasonable diligence will be exercised 
to reduce waste and achieve conservation.53 
38 Texas Water Code § 11.002(6). 
39 California Water Code §§ 1240-1244. 
40 i.e., California Water Code, Ch. 2. 
41 i.e., California Water Code, Ch. 3. 
42 i.e., California Water Code, Ch. 4 and Ch. 5. 
43 Act approved Mar. 19, 1889, 21st Leg. R. S., ch. 88 § 1-17, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 100. 
44 Act approved Mar. 21, 1895, 24th Leg. R. S., ch. 21 § 1, 1895 Tex. Gen. Laws 21. 
4
°' The Burges-Glasscock Act, Act of April 9, 1913, 33d Leg., R. S., ch 171, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 258. 
46 Frank Skillern, Texas Water Law, 37-8 (1993). 
47 Texas Water Code § 11.134(b)(2). 
48 Texas Water Code§ 11.134(b)(3)(A). 
49 Texas Water Code § 11.134(b)(3)(B). 
so Texas Water Code § 11.134(b)(3)(C). 
51 Texas Water Code § 11.134(b)(3)(D). 
52 Texas Water Code § 11.134(b)(3)(E). 
53 Texas Water Code§ 11.134(b)(4). 
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Here we see that surface water use in Texas addresses a number of issues both 
economic (waste) and environmental (fish and wildlife). The permit processes even addresses 
the possible effects of surface water appropriations on groundwater. We will se that Texas 
groundwater law does not incorporate these same considerations. 
IV. GROlJND WATER LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
While surface water is generally governed by two regimes, groundwater regimes in 
the United States generally are governed by one of five regimes: American reasonable use, 
correlative rights, Restatement (Second) of Torts reasonable use, prior appropriation, and 
absolute ownership (or rule of capture). American reasonable use doctrine places only two 
limitations on groundwater use: the water must be put to a reasonable use and the use must 
be in the overlying tract. 54 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sums up the basic tenet of 
American reasonable use by stating that a property owner "may not concentrate ... waters and 
convey them off his land if the springs or wells of another are impaired."55 
Correlative rights doctrine, as the name implies, entails a sharing of water between 
the owners of the land overlying the groundwater supply. Parties wishing to use the water 
off-tract have their rights subjugated to any on-tract users; thus, off-tract use is only perrnitted 
if there is "surplus" water (defined as recharge less current withdrawals).56 In Katz v. 
Walkinshaw, the California Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of correlative rights 
was superior to that of absolute ownership because it provided greater incentive for 
investment.57 Overlying owners wishing to use water on their land should each be given a 
"fair and just proportion" of the water if there is insufficient water for all.58 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, although a liability rule, acts as a rule of 
allocation by holding a groundwater extractor liable for unreasonable harm to others.59 
Section 858 of the Restatement lays out the liability for ground water usage.60 A landowner 
who extracts groundwater is not liable for harm to another unless the pumping lowers the 
water table or water pressure,61 exceeds the pumper's reasonable share of the groundwater,62 
or has a direct effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreasonably causes harm to a person 
entitled to use that watercourse or lake.63 Unlike the American reasonable use doctrine and 
54 Sax et al., supra note 23, at 364. 
55 Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 134 (1940). 
56 Sax et al., supra note 23, at 364. 
57 141Cal.116, 133 (1903). 
58 Id. at 136. 
59 Sax et al., supra note 23, at 365. 
60 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 858 (1979). 
61 Id. at§ 858(1)(a). 
62 Id. at§ 858(1)(b). 
63 Id. at§ 858(1)(c). 
64 Hinton v. Little, 50 Idaho 371 (1931). 
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the correlative rights doctrine, the Restatement does not limit usage to on-tract or even favor 
on-tract usage. It does, though, incorporate liability that could be utilized as a cause of 
action to protect biodiversity. ff the groundwater pumping significantly and unreasonably 
affects a stream or lake, then an action can be brought, but this action must be brought on 
behalf of someone who has a right to use that stream or lake. This presents a hurdle for the 
use of liability under the Restatement to protect biodiversity, but it provides more of an 
opportunity to do so than the above mentioned regimes. 
Prior appropriation for groundwater functions similarly to prior appropriation for 
surface water. It is premised on the "first in time, first in right" adage. The Supreme Court 
of Idaho was the first adopted the regime for groundwater in 1931.64 Although the 
groundwater doctrine operates in many ways like it does for surface water, there are a few 
different issues when groundwater is addressed. One important one involves the speed of 
groundwater flow. Groundwater: flows much slower than surface water, so the effects of 
"junior" appropriators on "senior's" rights may not be felt for many months or even years. 
In this case it is difficult for the senior the halt the junior's pumping so that the senior can be 
guaranteed his share of the water. This doctrine does not address the effects on biodiversity 
of pumping. It simply is designed to allocate water between pumpers. 
The final regime, absolute ownership, or rule of capture, is only practiced in Texas. 
As such it is address in the following section. 
V.. TEXAS GROUNDWATER LAW 
To extract groundwater Texas only requires an individual own the surface property 
and own a well on the property. Once these two conditions have been met, the individual 
may extract an unlimited amount of groundwater. The Texas Rule of Capture has been 
much maligned,65 but the courts have been reluctant to alter the one-hundred--year-old rule, 
preferring to shift that task to the Legislature. 
A. Devdopment of the Rule of Capture 
In 1904, the Texas Supreme imported the English common law rule of absolute 
domain to Texas. 66 Absolute dominion allows the surface owner to extract the groundwater 
65 See Stephanie E. Hayes Lusk, Texas Groundwater: Reconciling the Rule of Capture with Environmental 
and Community Demands, 30 St. Mary's L.J. 305 (1998); Eric Opiela, The Rule of Capture in Texas: An 
Outdated Principle Beyond Its Time, 6 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 87 (2002); Robert R.M. Verchick, Dust Bowl 
Blues: Saving and Sharing the Ogallala Aquifer, 14 J. Envtl. L & Litig. 13, 21 (1999). 
66 Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W 279 (fex. 1904) (adopting Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 
(Ex. 1843)). 
67 See id. 
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under the property regardless of the effects on neighboring properties, provided the surface 
owner did not do so in waste or out of malice.67 The court based its rationale on the 
conjecture that the movements of groundwater "are so secret, occult, and concealed that an 
attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless 
uncertainty, and would, therefore, be practically impossible."68 East continues to form the 
basis of groundwater in Texas even though, as shown above, science has greatly expanded 
our knowledge of groundwater and its role in the hydro logic cycle. 
Shortly after the East decision, Texans understood the ill affects on water management 
that could follow from the rule of capture.69 In response, the Texas Legislature adopted the 
Conservation Amendment to the Texas Constitution in 1917. 70 The Amendment gave the 
Legislature the authority to pass laws creating conservation districts and water regulations to 
protect the water resources in the state. 71 Although given the power to regulate groundwater 
extraction, the Legislature failed to take any action in the following decades. 
In 1949, The Legislature adopted the Texas Underground Water Conservation Act 
which codified the Rule of Capture .. 72 The Act recognizes that" [t]he ownership and rights 
of the owner of the land, his lessees and assigns, in underground water."73 The Act does 
not address the issue of groundwater management or conservation. 
Following the Hoods and droughts of the 1950s, the Legislature enacted the 1967 
Water Rights Ad,iudication Act.74 The Act allows the state to regulate surface waters when 
necessary, but leaves groundwater outside the scope of the Act. Once again, the Legish1ture 
failed to address the incompatibility of the rule of capture with water conservation. 
The courts and the Legislature have placed some restrictions on the ability of land 
owners to extract groundwater, but these limitations are slight and often difficult to prove. 
One limitation is that a land owner cannot extract water with malice in order to injure a 
neighbor. Malice is difficult to prove and has not been an issue in a Texas groundwater 
case .. 75 Waste, though, is a more often cited limitation on the rule of capture. In City of 
Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, the Texas Supreme Court narrowed the scope of this 
limitation.76 The city of Corpus Christi's extraction of water from an artesian well and 
68 Id at 280 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861)). 
69 See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993). 
70 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59. 
71 TEX. CONST. art. XVI,§ 59(b). 
72 Texas Water Code Act Amending Chapter 25, ch. 306, 1, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 559 (recodified in TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002. 
73 Id, 1, 3c(D). 
74 Act of April 13, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S. ch. 45, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 86 (Vernon) (codified as TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN.§ 11.301-.341. 
75 See Opiela, supra note 65, at 101. 
76 154 Tex. 289 (1955). 
77 Id. at 294. 
78 Id. at 298. 
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transportatiion of the water along a surface watercourse w:as upheld. The court held that the 
waste limitation only pertained to use of the water, not transport of the water. 77 Under this 
definition,, dissenting Justice Griffin argues, the loss of 9,999,999 gallons is permitted, so 
long as one gallon is put to lawful use.78 
The Supreme Court stripped away some of the rule of capture in Friendswood 
Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc. 79 Due to subsidence problems along 
the Texas coast, the Legislature established the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District 
(HGCSD) to oversee groundwater removal. Friendswood Development sued Smith-
Southwest Industries claiming subsidence caused by defendant's groundwater pumping. 
The court held that the injury occurred before the establishment of the HGCSD, thus no 
relief was granted to Friendswood Development.80 At the time of the injury, the law 
allowed land owners to extract groundwater without liability to neighboring land owners. 81 
After the opinion becomes final, the court adds, "if the landowner's manner of withdrawing 
ground water from his land is negligent ... and such conduct is a proximate cause of the 
subsidence of the land of others, he will be liable for the consequences of his conduct."82 
The court, thus, adds negligence to the short list of limitations on the rule of capture. 
B. Deference to Legislature 
Increasingly the scientific community has shown that groundwater and surface 
water can, and often are, linked, such that actions affecting one source may be felt by the 
ot.her.83 The courts have recognized this fact, but still refuse to alter the present rule of 
capture. Instead, the courts punt, stating that the issue is one for Legislative authority, not 
judicial authority. In Pecos County U7ater Control & Improvement District No. 1 'U. 
Williams, we see an early argument based on the groundwater-surface water connection.84 
The county sued to enjoin Williams from pumping groundwater from his property. The 
county based its argument on the detriment effect the pumping would have on Comanche 
Springs. The El Paso Court of Civil Appeals was not persuaded by the evidence of a 
connection between Williams' pumping of groundwater and the spring's water level.85 The 
court, thus, held for Williams upholding the Rule of Capture. 
79 276 S.W2d 21 (Tex. 1978). 
80 Friendswood, 276 S.W2d at 22. 
81 Id. at 27. 
82 Id. at 30. 
83 See IL... Hydrogeology Primer above. 
84 271 S.W2d 503 (fex. Civ. App. - El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
85 Id. at 508. 
86 Beckendorf! v. Harris Galveston Coastal Subsidence District, 558 S.W2d 75 (Tex. Civ .. App.-Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 
87 Id. at 81. 
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As mentioned above, the HGCSD was recreated to address the subsidence problem 
that groundwater extraction was causing along the Texas coast. In 1977 residents filed suit 
claiming that the Act establishing the HGCSD was unconstitutional. 86 The appeals court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act and 3tated that any action to eliminate a "perceived 
evil" should be taken by the Legislature. 87 
In Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., The Austin Court of Appeals ruled for a land 
owner who was extracting groundwater before it reached Kickapoo Springs. 88 Kickapoo 
Springs, in turn, fed Kickapoo Creek. The court reasserted the right of the land owner to his 
groundwater, even though the water would eventually feed a creek. Faced with yet another 
instance of the absolute groundwater rights detrimentally affecting surface waters and, in 
turn, downstream users, the court refused to alter the basic rule. 
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court once again upheld the rule of capture and 
inferred that the legislature needed to take action. In Sipriano v. Great Springs Waters of 
America, Inc. alk/a Ozarka Natural Spring Water Co., the plaintiffs sued Ozarka for 
damages after their wells ran dry.89 Ozarka had been pumping 90,000 gallons per day, seven 
days a week from land neighboring the plaintiffs.90 The court reasoned that the people of 
Texas had the ability to alter groundwater rules through the democratic process, as they 
recently did with Senate Bill 1 (see below), and until it was apparent that this legislative action 
was ineffective, water-use regulation should not be governed by "judicial fiat." 91 
VI. EDWARDS AQUIFER: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF 
GROUNDWATERFORENVIRONMENTALPURPOSES 
We have seen how the Texas courts generally have been reluctant to reconcile the 
scientific evidence of groundwater-surface water linkage with tl1e rule of capture. One area in 
which the courts have addressed this issue is with respect to the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) and the Edwards .Aquifer (Aquifer). 92 The Aquifer is a large groundwater formation 
in south-central Texas that is source for all of San Antonio's drinking water. The Aquifer 
88 771 S.W2d 235 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, pet. denied). 
89 1 SW3d 75 (Tex. 1999). 
90 Id. at 75. 
91 ld. at 80. 
92 See Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish That Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater Law, 
and Private Property Rights Collide over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 Envtl. L. 845 (1998) for a more 
in depth account of this topic. 
93 San Marcos/Comal Recovery Team, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., San Marcos and Comal Springs and 
Associated Aquatic Ecosystems (Revised) Recovery Plan 6 (1996). 
94 No. M0-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353,, at *1 (WD. Texas, Feb. 1, 1993). 
95 Id. at *19. 
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feeds both Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs, home to two of the richest aquatic 
ecosystems in terms of organism diversity.93 This Aquifer has become the frontline of the 
debate about groundwater rights and environmental management in Texas. 
A. Sierra Club v. Lujan 
In Sierra C1ub v. Lujan, the Sierra Club and other plaintiffs sued to enjoin the 
Secretary of the Interior and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) from 
pumping from the Aquifer under certain conditions and to implement a recover plan for the 
numerous endangered species within the Aquifer. 94 The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, 
finding that the USF\X'S failed to establish minimum springflow requirements to protect 
the endangered species in the Aquifer.95 The court called upon the Texas legislature to 
establish an adequate state plan before Federal intervention to protect the endangered species.96 
The Texas legislature subsequently enacted Senate Bill 1477 establishing the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA).97 The purpose of the EAA is to "ensure thaL .. the 
continuous minimum springHows of the Comal Springs and the San Marcos Springs are 
maintained to protect endangered and threatened species to the extent required by federal 
law."98 In 1996, after three years of litigation and revised plans, the USFWS finally published 
an acceptable recovery plan. 
B. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority 
In Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, the Texas Supreme Court limited the rule 
of capture slightly.99 The court extended the notion of the waste exception on the rule of 
capture by holding that the "[a]uthority to prevent waste ... refers ... to the broader concept 
of preventing waste by conserving, protecting, and preserving the aquifer the aqrufer through 
the Legislature's designated permit system."100 In Bragg, the plaintiffs sought permits to 
withdraw groundwater in order to irrigate commercial pecan orchards. The EAA's general 
manager recommended denying the permit for one well because rio water had been withdrawn 
during the historical use period and recommended a smaller allotment of water for the other 
well. 101 The EAA's authority was upheld in this case allowing for limitations on the rule of 
capture within the area affecting the Edwards Aquifer. 
96 Id. at *29-30. 
97 S. 1477, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (fex. 1993). 
98 Ch 621, 199 5 Tex. Gen. Laws 1.14(h). 
99 71 S.W.3d 729 (fex. 2002). 
100 Id. at 736; Tex Gov't Code 2007.003(b)(11)(C) \'Vernon 2000). 
101 Bragg, 71 S.W3d at 732. 
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VII. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The Endangered Species Act has been the major tool by which the rule of capture 
has been limited, but it is not sufficient if we are to protect the ecosystems that rely on 
groundwater. The shortcomings of the ESA have been weU documented.102 The purpose 
of the ESA is to protected specific species that are near extinction.103 This purpose highlights 
the first shortcoming of the ESA, threshold qualification. The ESA defines an endangered 
species as "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion 
of its range."104 A threatened species is defined as "any species which is likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of 
its range."105 These definitions create a dangerously high threshold of endangerment before 
action can be taken. By the time a species "qualifies" for endangered species status, it may be 
too late for recovery. 106 
A second shortcoming of the ESA is the focus itself of the ESA: species. This 
focus is faulty for a number of reasons. The interdependent nature of species dictates that 
successful recover is better achieved at the ecosystem level than at the species level. 107 Change 
is a natural part of the environment and species need to be able to adapt to the changes in 
their communities through these interdependencies.108 Further, focusing on species is more 
costly than focusing on broader categories of flora and fauna or on ecosystems as a whole.109 
The interdependence argument forms the basis for why species level management is 
often ineffective and inefficient. A recent example highlights this point. Off the Aleutian 
Island of Alaska, sea otters populations have been decimated.110 The otters eat sea urchins, 
102 Se:e John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52 
Hastings L.J. 1149 (2001) (from which much of this section comes), Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological 
Reasons W7ry the Endangered Species Act Doesn't Work - And What to Do About It, 5 Conservation 
Biology 273 (Sept. 1991); But see also Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Management, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 869 (1997)(arguing that the ESA has been effective). 
103 The Preamble of the ESA states that "[t]he purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to 
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to 
take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth 
in subsection (a) of this section." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000). 
104 16 u.s.c. § 1532(6). 
lOS 16 u.s.c. § 1532(20). 
106 The problems that a species as well as those trying to save the species must overcome once it has 
reached this threshold include loss of genetic diversity, usually depleted habitat, risk of extinction 
through random chance or natural disaster, as well as larger costs to nurse a small group back to a 
viable population. 
107 Mark L. Shaffer, Minimum Population Sizes for Sp1~cie:s Conservation, 31 Bioscience 131 (1981). 
108 Jeffrey A. McNeely et al., Conserving the World's Biological Diversity, 57 (1990) 
!OQ J. Michael Schott et al., Species Richness: A Geographic Approach to Protecting Future Biological 
Diversity, 37 Bioscience 782, 783 (1987). 
110 See "Alaska Sea Otters' Disappearance a Mystery," www.cnn.com2004/TECH/science/02/04/ 
otter.mystery.reut/ (last accessed February 22, 2004). 
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which eat kelp. Without otters to eat to control the urchin population, the local kelp forests 
are being decimated. One possible theory to explain the fall in otter populations is that orcas 
are feeding of otters since their normal prey, other whales, sea lions, and harbor seals, have 
seen reduced populations. Protecting one species at a time here, say sea lions, does not 
confront the main issue: scarcity of prey for orcas. In order to protect the biodiversity off the 
Aleutian Islands, a broader approach to the marine ecosystem is needed. 
An additional problem with the ESA is the lack of a priority system for species 
protection. The ESA allows for "consideration of the economic impact" when designating 
critical habitat,111 but not for determining which species should be listed as endangered or 
threatened. 112 There are many considerations one could have in constructing a priority 
system. A priority system, though, does entail problems. 
The first is how to construct the schemes. Priority could be based on helping the most 
endangered species. This scheme, though, would be fraught with problems as many of these 
species may be past the point of revitalization given the ESRs threshold requirements. Priority 
could be based on "value" or "importance," but this system, too has problems. Since we only 
have identified a portion of world's species, it is incredibly unlikely that we even know of the 
potential benefits (genetically, medicinally, etc.) that can be derived from many species. What is 
important today may not be important tomorrow; further, technology may make species X 
infinitely important tomorrow, when it is has little value today. 
Second, many priority systems entail an anthropocentric approach to protection and 
conservation. Priority schemes that focus on "value" or "charismatic megafauna"113 focus 
on the human perception of species protection without much regard for the "ecosystemic" 
perception of species protection. Priority systems may entail problems, but without any 
ranking system, the ESA is even less effective and focused. 
An additional shortcoming of the ESA is its lack of emphasis on multiple population 
maintenance. Multiple populations increase the likelihood for species survival by reducing 
catastrophic risk and increasing genetic diversity, and thus adaptation. The ESA defines 
"species" as "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment 
of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature."114 This is the 
only mentjon of different populations of species. Multiple populations are crucial to the 
long term survival of many species. By the time a species is listed it could have one population 
of limited numbers or multiple populations with unviable numbers. In either case, the 
ultimate survival of the species is greatly imperiled. 
111 16 u.s.c. 1533(b)(2). 
112 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(1)(A). 
113 Rohlf~ supra note 102, at 275. 
114 16 u.s.c. § 1532(16). 
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VIII. SENATE BILL 1 AND GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION 
DISTRICTS 
On June 1, 1997, the Texas legislature enacted Senate Bill 1 (SB 1 ).115 In SB 1, the 
legislature overhauled state water law and policy, but failed to adequately address the rule of 
capture or the effects on environmental concerns of groundwater management. SB 1 does 
recognize the interconnectedness of surface water and groundwater and requires that decisions 
on permits take into account the effects on groundwater and groundwater recharge.116 But 
this provision addresses surface water rights and their affects on groundwater, not the effects 
of groundwater rights on surface waters. 
In addressing the rule of capture, Senator Brown states that "groundwater 
management is best accomplished through locally-elected, locally-controlled groundwater 
conservation districts, thus providing that any modification or limitation on the rule of 
capture will be made by local groundwater districts."117 The legislature sees these Groundwater 
Conservation Districts (GCD) as the preferred method of groundwater management.118 The 
legislature created GCDs for the "conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and 
prevention of waste of groundurater" in Texas.119 The GCDs are authorized to promulgate 
rules that may limit groundwater rights .. 120 Individuals seeking to alter the size of a well or well 
pump or to operate a new well, must obtain a permit from the district.121 Among the issues 
the GCD must consider when evaluating a permit to drill a well or alter a well is "whether the 
proposed use of water unreasonably affects existing groundwater and surface water 
resources."122 By explicitly including the groundwater-surface water connection in the permit 
decision-making scheme, the legislature, even if only slightly, signaled that the end of the rule 
of capture may be neigh, but little action has been taken to further curtail the regime. 
As argued above, groundwater extraction can have far reaching consequences. A 
GCD may be able to regulate groundwater if its jurisdiction encompasses the entire 
groundwater area, but for aquifers, like the Ogallala, that stretch across many states, the 
incentives for the local GMD to manage that aquifer are drastically different. SB 1 does not 
-::i Jequately address the rule of capture, does not adequately take into account the environmental 
ra-.nifications of GMD decisions, and does not adec1uately deal with transboundary 
groundwater issues. 
115 Act of June 1, 1997 [S.B. 1], 75th Leg., R.S., ch 1010, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610 (codified at Tex. Health & 
Safety Code§§ 341.0315, .. 0351-.0356, .0485,.049, Tex Tax Code§ ; See Senator J.E. "Buster" Brown, Seriate 
Bill I: We've Never Changed Texas Water La'w This Way Before, 28 St. B. Tex. Envtl. L.J. 152 (1998). 
116 Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 11.l34(b)(3)(D), 11.151. 
117 Brown, supra note 115, at 157 (referring to Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.0015). 
118 Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.0015. 
119 Id .. 
120 Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.002 
121 Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.113(a) and Tex. Water Code Ann. §36.115(a). 
122 Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36.113(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
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IX. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN 
BRAZIL 
One of the striking differences between American environmental law and Brazilian 
environmental law is the built in environmental guarantees in the Brazilian constitution. 
The constitutionalization of environmental protection is a phenomenon common to many 
countries who wrote their constitutions subsequent to the environmental movement of 
the 1970s, including Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Brazil. 123 The fact that environmental 
concerns are enunciated in the constitution effects the legal development of a country in two 
important and related ways. First, a constitution provides the general lens through which all 
other laws must be seen. Subsequent laws must be interpreted in light of the highest law of 
the land, the constitution, thus all laws must concord with the fundamentals established in 
the constitution. Second, the constitution reflects the country's concerns and shapes national 
dialogue. Censorship and the need for a free exchange of ideas was a main concern of the 
framers of the American Constitution; thus, freedom of speech attained a primary role in 
the Constitution. More than two hundred years later, debates over educational material, 
artwork, media relations, and many other issues are constructed within the realm of freedom 
of speech. 
The Brazilian Constitution sets forth a number of environmental rights as well as 
distributes competencies to different levels of government. Article 225 sets forth the basic 
right to a clean environment: 
Todos tern direito ao meio ambiente ecologicamente 
equilibrado, bem de uso comum do povo e essencial a sadia 
gualidade de vida, impondo-se ao Po.der Publico e a 
coletividade o clever de defende-lo para as presentes e futures 
gerar;:oes.124 
Beyond this basic right, the Constitution establishes a number of rights that are not 
specific to environmental protection, but can be invoked to protect individuals from 
environmental damage: 125 right to life, 126 right to health,127 right to property, 128 right to 
information,129 rights of indigenous peoples, 130 and the right to public civil :action.131 
123 Antonio Herman V. Benjamin, lntrodur;ao ao Direito Ambiental Brasileiro, Cadernos do Programa de 
P6s-Graduac;:ao em Direito - PPGDir./UFGRS, vol. II, num V (2004), 94, 99. 
124 Constituic;:ao Federal, art. 225, caput. 
125 Benjamin, supra note 124, at 103 (making distinction between explicit and implicit environmental 
rights). 
126 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 5, caput. 
127 See, Constituic;:ao Federal, art 200. 
128 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 5, inciso XXIII, and art. 186, inciso II. 
129 Constituic;:ao Federal,, art 5, incisos XIV and XXXIII. 
13° Constituic;:ao Federal, art 231, § 1. 
131 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 129, inciso III, and § 1. 
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The Brazilian Constitution divides competencies into: those unique to the federal 
government;132 those common to the federal government, the states, the federal district, and 
cities;133 those concurrent to the federal government, the states, and the federal district;134 
those unique to the states;135 those unique to the cities;136 and those unique to the federal 
district. 137 For each of these groups, the constitution assigns some form of competency 
relating to the environment. 
Additionally, the chapter on the environment, article 225, states that it is incumbent 
upon the Pod er Publico to preserve ecological processes, 138 preserve genetic diversity, 139 
establish protected areas, 140 supply environmental impact studies, 141 control the utilization 
of techniques, methods, or substances that pose a risk to human health and the 
envi.ronment,142 promote environmental education and awareness,143 and protect flora and 
fauna from extinction. 144 Thus, the Brazilian Constitution establishes a right to clean 
environment, and charges the government with the protection of the environment, while 
allocating competency for environmental protection at multiple levels. 
X. GROUNDWATER LAW IN BRAZIL 
The groundwater legal system stems from the Constitution and the "Lei das 
Aguas."145 As mentioned above, the basic rights enumerated in the Constitution shape the 
structure of groundwater system. 
Groundwater law in Brazil is divided between the federal government and the 
state governments. Article 22 of the Constitution gives the federal government the exclusive 
power to legislate over waters. The power to "lesgislar sobre aguas" means the ability to set 
standards of quality and quantity as well as establish rules for the division and utilization of 
waters. 146 The definition of waters as "'bem de uso comum de povo"147 eliminates the 
132 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 22. 
133 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 23. 
134 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 24. 
135 Constituic;:ao Federal, art. 25, § 1. 
136 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 30, I and II. 
137 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 32, § 1. 
138 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, I. 
139 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, II. 
140 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, III. 
141 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, lV. 
142 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, V. 
143 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, VI. 
144 Constituic;:ao Federal, art 225, VII. 
145 Lei N. 9.433, de 8 de janeiro de 1997. 
146 Paulo Affonso Leme Machado, Recursos Hidricos: Direito Brasileiro e International, 19 (2002). 
147 Constituc;:ao Federal, art 225, caput. 
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ability of an individual person to appropriate waters to the exclusion of others.148 This 
interpretation is underscored by the requirement that "extra<;ao de agua de aqiiifero 
subterraneo para consumo final ou insumo de processo produtivo" is subject to the 
authorization of the government,149 and it is illegal "perforar po<;OS para extra<;ao de agua 
subteranea ou opera-los sem a devida autoriza<;ao."150 Interestingly, this law reverses the law 
established under the 1934 Water Code, which allows a type of correlative rights: 
0 dono de qualquer terreno podera appropriar-se por meio 
de po<;os, galerias, etc., das aguas que existam debaixo da 
suberficie de seu predio contanto que nao prejudique 
aproveitamentos existentes nem derive de seu curso natural 
aguaS publicaS dominicais, publicas de USO comum OU 
particulares.151 
Additionally, neither the federal government nor the state governments have the 
right to sell water commercially.152 
While the constitution sets forth limits upon the use of groundwater, the 
constitution is less clear on the ownership of the groundwater. Under the Federal 
Constitution, "as aguas superficiais ou subteraneas, fluentes, emergentes e em dep6sito" 
belong to the states. 153 
XI. GROUNDWATER LAW IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL 
Unlike Texas, Rio Grande do Sul has built in ecological considerations into its 
groundwater regime. By establishing the hydrological basin as the unit of administration 
for the governing water agency, Politi ca N acional de Recursos Hidricos, Rio Grande do Sul 
explicitly acknowledges the interaction between surface water and groundwater. 154 This 
interaction is a consideration in water policy: "as intera<;oes com as aguas superficiais, 
observadas no ciclo hidrol6gico, sempre serao consideradas na administrai~ao do 
aproveitamento das aguas subterraneas."155 Additionally, state agencies may: 
Dada a necessaria conserva<;ao das aguas subterraneas e a 
prioridade de abastecimento da popula<;ao humana, ou por 
148 Machado, swpra note 147, 25; Virginia Amaral da Cunha Scheibe, 0 Regime Constitucional das Aguas, 
Revista de Direito Ambiental, vol 25, 207, 210 .. 
149 Lei N. 9.433, de Janeiro d.e 1997, art. 12, IL 
150 Lei N. 9.433, de Janeiro de 1997, art. 49, V. 
151 Decreto N. 24.643, de 10 de julho de 1934, art. 96. 
152 Machado, supra note 147, 29. 
153 ConstitU<;:ao Federal, art 26, I. 
154 Lei N. 9.433, de 8 de janeiro de 1997, art. 1, V. 
155 Rio Grande do Sul: Decreto N. 42.047, de 26 de dezembro de 2002, art. 3, paragrafo unico. 
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motivos geol6gicos, hidrol6gicos, geotecnicos ou ecol6gicos, 
poderao restringir a captac;:ao e o uso dessas aguas, bem como 
instituir areas de protec;:ao dos aqiliferos. 156 
By explicitly acknowledging the hydrological link between ground and surface water 
and including ecological concerns in the decision making process, Rio Grande do Sul is 
constructing an integrated regime in which water management is in sync with environmental 
management. 
Well monitoring is part of this integrated regime. Wells are required to have devices 
that monitor the amount and quality of water extracted, and well owners must report this 
information to the governing agency.1s7 Well owners must operate their wells "em condic;:oes 
adequadas, de modo a assegurar a capacidade do aqwfero e evitar o desperdicio de agua."158 
Just as is the case in federal law, it is illegal in Rio Grande do Sul "executar a perfurac;:ao de 
poc;:os ou a captac;:ao de agua subter:ranea sem a devida aprovac;:ao."159 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Groundwater and surface water are hydrologically linked. Actfons taken below 
ground affect water levels and ecosystems above ground. Environmental protection and 
water management need to be made in unison in order for either to be effective or efficient. 
Federal law in the United States does not establish an environmental basis for water policy. 
In Texas, two separate regimes govern the use of ground and surface waters. This lack of a 
coherent regime has many detrimental effects on biodiversity. The rule of capture, which 
governs groundwater, can lead to excessive pumping and the draining of streams and lakes 
that are connected to the aquifer. Many different types of species of plants and animals rely 
on the surface water, and sometimes on the groundwater. By not having conservation laws 
that impact the rates of groundwater pumping, Texas is in effect allowing land owners to 
drain the biodiversit;y through wells and pumps. 
Brazil establishes the water basin as the administrative unit for water management, 
rather than any portions such as groundwater or surface water. In Rio Grande do Sul, the 
interaction between ground and surface water is explicitly recognized, and the need for 
ecological considerations in evaluating groundwater extraction is made explicit. Rio Grande 
do Sul, as well as other American states, have acknowledge the need for integrated water 
management and have taken steps to curtail excessive pumping and thus protect biodiversity. 
156 Rio Grande do Sul: Decreto N. 42.047, de 26 de dezembro de 2002, art. 27, caput. (emphasis added). 
157 Rio Grande do Sul: Decreto N. 42.047, de 26 de dezembro de 2002, art. 24 § 1. 
158 Rio Grande do Sul: Decreto N. 42.047, de 26 de dezembro de 2002, art. 23. 
159 Rio Grande do Sul: Lei N. 10.350, de 30 de dezembro de 1994. 
